After nearly a decade of failed attempts to repatriate Rohingya refugees, Bangladesh is again looking towards regional diplomacy, with plans to hold discussions with China and Myanmar on the crisis this month. State Minister for Foreign Affairs Humayun Kabir said the prolonged displacement of more than one million Rohingya could ultimately be resolved only through a political settlement.
Bangladesh has consistently maintained that Rohingya repatriation must be safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable.
China’s involvement is significant because Beijing maintains close relations with both Bangladesh and Myanmar. China has major economic interests in both countries and a direct interest in stability around the Bay of Bengal.
China has been engaged in diplomatic efforts on the Rohingya crisis for years. In 2019, it helped establish a trilateral framework involving Bangladesh and Myanmar, aimed at facilitating Rohingya repatriation and supporting economic development in Rakhine State.
Renewed talks offer an opportunity to view the Rohingya crisis not only as a humanitarian issue but also as a regional challenge in which China’s diplomatic, economic and strategic interests increasingly converge.
A return to stability in Rakhine State could benefit China in several ways. Rakhine occupies an important place in China’s regional connectivity and trade plans. China and Myanmar have agreed to advance key components of the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, including the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port.
Oil and gas pipelines running from Myanmar’s coast to China have also given the region considerable strategic importance. During Myanmar President Min Aung Hlaing’s visit to China last June, the two countries again pledged to advance the economic corridor and other infrastructure projects.
Long-term instability is therefore not aligned with China’s economic interests. Infrastructure projects require predictable border conditions, functioning local economies, secure transport systems and political stability. Prolonged conflict and displacement create the opposite conditions.
A meaningful political arrangement for the Rohingya could therefore advance, rather than obstruct, China’s economic objectives.
The same applies to Bangladesh. Relations between Beijing and Dhaka have expanded significantly in recent years. During Prime Minister Tarique Rahman’s visit to China this year, the two sides discussed infrastructure, investment, ports, energy and broader economic connectivity.
Bangladesh and China are also exploring the possibility of working on the Bangladesh-China-Myanmar Economic Corridor. Officials from Dhaka and Beijing discussed the proposal again this month.
The Rohingya crisis is directly connected to this economic geography. A corridor linking Bangladesh, Myanmar and China would pass through a region whose economic potential has been hindered by insecurity and political divisions.
Resolving the crisis is therefore not separate from regional development. It could instead become part of the foundation for deeper regional economic integration.
Humanitarian crises and economic development are often treated as separate policy issues. In reality, prolonged displacement can impose major economic and political costs across an entire region.
Bangladesh is hosting more than one million Rohingya refugees, placing substantial pressure on public services, local communities and the environment. Dhaka has repeatedly stated that indefinite displacement cannot be a permanent solution.
China has previously recognised the relationship between political stability and development. Its earlier trilateral framework identified development in Rakhine, alongside Rohingya repatriation and dialogue, as an important part of resolving the crisis.
Repatriation will not be sustainable simply by returning refugees across the border. Returning Rohingya will require livelihoods, education, healthcare, infrastructure and security. Economic reconstruction is not a substitute for political rights, but if properly managed, it can create the material conditions on which a lasting political settlement can rest.
China has particular capacity in this regard. Few countries combine diplomatic access to Myanmar, close relations with Bangladesh and the ability to make large-scale infrastructure and development investments.
China also retains channels of communication with Myanmar. Western engagement with the country has been limited by sanctions and political isolation, while Beijing has maintained working relations with Myanmar’s government and developed increasingly close ties with Bangladesh.
Diplomatic success, however, is not guaranteed. Myanmar’s civil war has made the situation significantly more complicated, and the political reality is now far more difficult than when the original trilateral framework was established.
Continued engagement could nevertheless create opportunities for gradual progress that may not be possible through open confrontation.
For Beijing, successful engagement in the crisis could also strengthen its broader diplomatic goals. China increasingly presents economic development, regional connectivity and political dialogue as complementary tools of international cooperation. The Rohingya crisis offers an opportunity to demonstrate how effective that model can be in practice.
A process that gradually creates conditions for voluntary repatriation, economic reconstruction and broader stability in Rakhine could generate benefits beyond the Rohingya population.
Bangladesh could gain relief from the long-standing burden of hosting refugees. Myanmar could achieve greater stability in a region important to its economic future. China could benefit from safer infrastructure, stronger regional connectivity and deeper economic relations with both Bangladesh and Myanmar.
Regional trade could expand, while the Bay of Bengal could develop deeper economic links with the rest of Asia.
There could also be security benefits. Prolonged refugee crises rarely remain solely humanitarian concerns. Poverty, lack of education, human-trafficking networks, irregular migration and recruitment by armed groups can gradually turn displacement into a broader regional security crisis.
Reducing these pressures is therefore in the interests of all major regional stakeholders.
Diplomacy will not be easy. Conditions inside Rakhine remain difficult, while Myanmar’s civil war has significantly altered territorial control. Any sustainable solution will need to address security, citizenship, political inclusion and the practical administration of areas to which Rohingya may return.
No single country can resolve these issues alone. China’s position, however, gives it an opportunity to play an important role in bringing the necessary parties into a practical, outcome-focused process.
China’s involvement need not be seen as a choice between humanitarian responsibility and national interest. The two can reinforce each other. A stable Rakhine would align with China’s economic interests. A more prosperous Bangladesh would strengthen an important bilateral partner. Secure regional corridors would support trade, while reduced displacement would lessen instability.
Nine years on, the Rohingya crisis should not be limited to another effort to manage displacement. A political and economic framework is needed to make a sustainable solution possible. China already possesses many of the relationships and economic tools required to contribute to such a framework.
For Beijing, helping resolve the Rohingya crisis would not only address one of Asia’s long-running humanitarian emergencies. It could also advance China’s important interests in regional stability, connectivity and development.
Writer: Dr Azeem Ibrahim, Director of Special Initiatives at the New Lines Institute for Strategy and Policy in Washington
Source: Arab News